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VI.
THE RESTRICTIONS ACTUALLY IN FORCE IN THE
SEVERAL STATES.
THE constitutions now in force in the several States
vary greatly with regard to the restrictions upon local and
special legislation. Those of the New England States;
except Maine, contain no restrictions whatever other than
such as are involved in the general prohibition of special
privileges, immunities, restraints, or disqualifications, usu-
ally contained in the bill of rights, and except also the
usual requirement of uniform taxation. The same7may be
said of the constitutions of Delaware and South Carolina,
except that they contain, inferentially, some prohibitions
of special laws in regard to the formation of corporations.
The constitution of Georgia makes direct mention of special
legislation only in the clause forbidding it in any case for
which provision has been made by an existing general law,
but the provision in this constitution, and that of Tennessee,
that the legislature shall pass no laws in regard to changes
of name, and a few other matters, is really directed against
special legislation, for it is further provided. that the legis-
lature may (or, in regard to certain matters, shall), by geii-
eral laws, confer on the courts power to -regulate these
matters.
The constitutions of Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio,
Virginia and Wisconsin contain very few restrictions, while
most of the newjor more recently amended constitutions
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have very many, and in these there is more uniformity,'
the whole set being in some .cases almost identical.
In the great majority of States the character of the
,legislation sought to be thus restricted is described as-
"local or special," but in Maine, Michigan, Minnesota r
South Dakota, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin, it is
"special or private;" while in Kansas, Ohio and Virginia,
it is "special" simply; in Mississippi and New Jersey,
"private, local or special;" -in New York, "private or
local ;" and in North Carolina, "private," except that in
regard to legislation for corporations the word "special" is
used.
From the above statement it appears that in eleven
States the constitution, though limiting the power of
special legislation, makes no reference whatever to local
laws, apparently because it was thought unnecessary to,
distinguish between legislation which .is strictly local and
that which may .be generally described as special, and cer-
tainly the reported cases in those States do not indicate
any attempts to distinguish between local and special
laws.'
The term "private law" used, in nine constitutions,
together with "special law," was probably intended to
refer particularly to, laws in regard to private interests, as
distinguished from special laws in regard to places or pub-
lic matters, but as the former as well as the latter are
special laws, the distinction would seem unnecessary.
In New York, where the expression is "private or
local law," the term "local law" appears to include special
Even this comparative uniformity is rather strikingly broken in
the case of the constitutions of North and South Dakota, both adopted
in 1889. The latter, which was originally adopted in 1885 for the pro-
posed State of Dakota, has less than a third as many prohibitions of
local and special legislation as are found in the former.
2Thus the laws passed unpon in Francis v. Atchison, etc., R. R. Co.,
19 Kan., 303, and Commrs. v. Shoemaker, 27 id., 77, were local rather
than special, but this point was not raised, and they were sustained only
on the ground of the inapplicability of general legislation to the objects
sought.
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laws in regard to local matters as well as those laws which
may be strictly defined as local.
On the whole, therefore, though the terms used are
not absolutely identical in all the States, there would seem
to be no ground for supposing that this indicates any real
difference in regard to the objects sought; and it may be
stated generally that all the restrictions here treated of
affect the power both of special and local legislation.1
These restrictions are found in the following constitu-
tions:
Alabama, 1875, Art. 4, Sec. 23; Art. 14, Sec. i.
Arkansat, 1874, Art. 5, Secs. 24, 25.
California, 1879, Art. 4, Sec. 25.
Colorado, 1876, Art. 5, Sec. 25; Art. i5, Sec. 12.
Delaware, 1831, amended 1875, Art. i, Sec. 17.
Florida, i885, Art. 3, Sec. 20.
Georgia, 1877, Art. 7, Sec. 4, Par. I; Art. 3, Sec. 7, Par. 18.
Idaho, 189o, Art. 3, Sec. 19.
Illinois, 187o, Art. 4, Sec. 22.
Indiana, 1851, Art. 4, Sec. 21. "
Iowa, 1857, Art. 3, Sec.. 30; Art. 8, Sec. i.
Kansas, 1859, Art. 2, Sed. 17; Art. 12, Sec. 5.
Kentucky, i89i, Secs. 59, 60.
Louisiana, 1879, Art. 46.
Maine, 1820, amended X876, Art. 4, Pt. 3, Secs. 12, 14.
Maryland, z867, Art. 3, Secs. 33, 48.
Michigan, i85o, Art. 4, Secs. 23, 26.
Minnesota, 1857, Art. 4, Sec. 28; Art. io, Sec. 2;
amended i88i, Art. 4, Sec. 33.
Mississippi, I8gI, Art. 4, Sec. 87-9 o .
Missouri, 1875, Art. 4, Sec. 53.
Montana, 1889, Art. 5, Sec. 26; Art. 12, Sec. ii.
Nebraska, 1875, Art. 3, Sec. i5.e
Nevada, 1864, Art. 4, Sec. 20.
New Jersey, 1844, amended 1875, Art. 4, Sec. 7, Par. ii.
New York, 1846, amended 1874, Art. 2, Sec. 18.
North Carolina, 1868, amended 1876, Art. 2, Secs. io, 12.
An exception exists in the constitution of Maryland, which forbids
special laws "for any case for which provision has been made by existing
general law :" local laws not being held to be within this prohibition.
State v. Commrs., 29 Md., 515; Lankford v. County Commrs., 73 id., xo5z
The prohibition, in the Kentucky constitution of i85o, of special
legislation for the sale of infants' real estate and some other matters,
may possibly be subject to a similar construction. See Marshall v. Mar-
shall, 4 Bush. (Ky.), 248.
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North Dakota, 1889, Art. 2, Secs. 69, 7o; Art. 7, See. 31.
0io, x851,' Art. 13, Sec. i.
Oregon, 1857, Art. 4, Sees. 23, 24.
Pennsylvania, x87.4, Art. 3, Sec. 7-
South Carolina, x868, Art. 12, Sec. I.
South Dakota, x889, Art. 3, Sees. 23, 24, 26; Art. 17, Sec. i.
Tennessee, i87o, Art. ixi, Secs. 5-8.
'Texas, 1876, Art 3, Sec. 56; Art. ii, See. 4.
Virginia, 187o, Art. 5, Sees. 17, 20.
'Washington, x889, Art. 2, Sec. 28; Art 12, Sec. i.
West Virginia, x872, Art. 6, See. 39.
Wipconsin, 1848, amended 1871, Art. 4, See. 31.
Wyoming, 189o, Art. , Sec. 29.
By the Act of Congress of July 30, 1886, a very corn-
plete'set of restrictions upon local and special legislation
was adopted for the territories.'
. I In none of these constitutions, even of those which
contain the greatest number of restrictions, nor in the Act
of Congress, is there any systematic grouping or arrange-
ment of the subjects of legislation affected thereby, and to
this lack of arrangement the great diversity among the
various constitutions may in part be owing. To make it
possible to ascertain readily what these restrictions are, an
arrangement is here attempted, and they have been grouped
in what has suggested itself as a natural order, each sub-
division being followed by a digest or comparison of cases
relating thereto. Many provisions being less complete in
some constitutions than in others, and the same provision
being often diffetently worded in different constitutions, all
those provisions which obviously concern the same matter
have been placed together; all differences in wording being
noted as far as practicable and only the ii ost 'rivial being
disregarded.
Surveying, then, the whole field of these restrictions,
they may be arranged in thirteen classes, with regard to the
-"subjects affected by them:
I. As to persons.
II. As to corporations.
III. As to rights, privileges, duties, property, etc.
1 24 U. S. Stats. at Large, chap. 8x8, p. 170.
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IV. As to interest, liens, trade, etc.
V. As to eminent domain, railroads, bridges, ferries,
etc.
VI. As to legal proceedings.
VII. As to municipal corporations and local, govern-
ment.
VIII. As to public officers.
IX. As to highways, public grounds, etc.
X. As to schools.
XI. As to taxation.
XII. As to elections.
XIII. General restrictions.
Taking these classes in their order, we find that local
and special legislation is forbidden in regard to the follow-
ing matters in the various States, as follows:
I. As To PERSONS.
(i) Changing names: Arkansas, California, Florida
(of legitimate children, Georgia), Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mpryland, Minnesota, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming,
Territories.
(2) Authorizing the adoption and legitimation of
children: Arkansas, California, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky
(adoption only, Louisiana 1), Mississippi, Missouri, Montana
(legitimation only, North Carolina), North Dakota, Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee, Texas, (adoption only, Washington,
Wyoming).
Constituting one person the heir of another: Minnesota
(heir-at-law, South Dakota, Washington), Wisconsin.
(3) Declaring any person of age: California, Colorado,
Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Texas,
Washington, Wyoming.
Emancipating minors: Louisiana.
'Hence legitimation by special act is allowable there: Hughes v.
"'Iurdock (Louisiana), 13 So. Rep, 182.
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Relieving minors from legal disabilities: Florida.
The removal of the disability of infancy: Mississippi.
Relieving an infant or feme covert of disability, or
nabling them to do acts allowed only to adults not under
disabilities : Kentucky.
* (4) Granting divorces: Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ne-
,vada (or securing alimony, North Carolina), North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wyoming, Territories.
In Michigan, Minnesota, Tennessee and Washington,
the legislature is simply forbidden to grant divorces, but as
practically this could only be done by a special act in each
'case, the provision is equivalent to a prohibition of special
legislation in the matter.
(5) Restoring to citizenship persons convicted of infam
ous'crimes: California, Idaho, Kentucky, Montana, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Wyoming.
The new Mississippi constitution provides (Art. XII,
§ 253) that' the legislature may, by a two-thirds yea-and-
nay vote, restore the right of suffrage to any person dis-
qualified by reason -of crime, but the reasons therefor must
be spread upon the journals.
The Arizona bill of rights prohibits the territorial
legislature from pardoning or commuting the sentence of
any criminal, the Federal statutes not expressly vesting the
power in the governor exclusively.
II. As TO CORPORATIONS.
Creating (private, Texas) corporations: California,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland; or amending, renewing,
or extending their charters: Colorado, Illinois (or explain-
ing the same, Louisiana, Missouri), Montana, Nebraska,
New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Texas.
Granting a charter to any corporation, or amending
the charter of any existing corporation : Kentucky.
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Creating corporations, or diminishing or increasing
their powers: Tennessee.
Conferring corporate powers and privileges: Alabama,
Arkansas (private corporations, Georgia), Kansas, Minne-
sota, New Jersey, Ohio, Washington, Wisconsin.
Granting charters : Territories.
The formation of corporations : Mississippi (Art. VII,
§ 148), and by Art. IV, § 88, this evidently includes laws
"'under which corporations may be created, organized, and
their acts of incorporation altered."
The legislature shall have power to enact a general
incorporation act to provide incorporation for religious,
,charitable, literary and manufacturing purposes, and for the
preservation of animal and vegetable food, building and
loan associations, and for draining low lands: Delaware.
Corporations shall be formed by general laws t South
Carolina.
The- legislature shall provide for the organization of
-corporations by general law: Wyoming.
Excejhtions.-Except -as to New Orleans or the organi- -
zation of levee districts and parishes: Louisiana.
Except for municipal purposes: Georgia, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota,' Montana, New York, Oregon; and
where (in the judgment of the legislature, Alabama, New
York the object cannot be attained otherwise: Alabama;-
Maine, New York; and in cases whefe no general laws
exist providing for the creation of corporations of the same
general character as the corporation proposed to be created:
Maryland. 2
Except for cities: Wisconsin.
Except for municipal, manufacturing, mining, immi-
gration, industrial or educational purposes; or for construct-
ing canals, or improving rivers and harbors: Alabama.
'See State v. Gurley, 37 Minn., 475.
- Hence as the general law "for the formation of savings institutions,
trust companies, and guaranty companies," did not grant the powers and
rights to act as trustee, executor, administrator assignee, receiver, etc.,
granted to the Baltimore Trust and Guarantee Co., by special act, such act
-was held valid: Reed v. Balto. Trust & G. Co., 72 Md., 531.
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Except for (municipal, Colorado) educational, charita-
ble, penal, or reformatory purposes: Montana; where they
are to be and remain under the patronage and control of
the State: Arkansas, Colorado, Illifiois, Nebraska, North
Dakota, South Dakota.
. Except banking, insurance, railroad, canal, navigation,
express and telegraph companies: Georgia.
In New York the-chartering of banks by special act is
expressly forbidden, and so in Montana and Wyoming as to
banks, insurance companies, and loan and trust companies,
but these provisions are apparently superfluous, the case
being sufficiently covered by the general clause as to cor-
porations.
Any act which contemplates the incorporation of one
or any definite number of corporations of a particular kind
is special. Thus in Wisconsin an act to enable members
of the Methodist Episcopal Church, or of annual confer-
ences, to form and regulate a corporation for the insurance
of church and parsonage property, and regulating such
corporation as to various matters, was held void, because
it evidently contemplated only one such corporation.'
While the circumstances or needs of a particular
locality necessarily affect the character of the corporations
to be found there, yet the nature of. any class of corpora-
tions is, in the main, the same wherever located, and hence
general corporation laws, other than municipal, cannot be
restricted in their operation to any locality or clkss of locali-
ties. Thus an act to incorporate street railways in cities
of certain classes only is a special law.'
The creation of a corporation includes the granting of
its corporate powers and privileges, and hence, where
,special laws creating corporations are forbidden, no corpo-
ration can possess any powers and privileges except such as
the general law may grant; and all special laws- under-
State v. Cheek, 77 Wis., 284. Whether it was also special because
it confided the power to incorporate for this purpose to Christians of the
Methodist Episcopal persuasion, was not passed upon.
2 Weinman v. Passenger Ry. Co., 118 Pa., 192.
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taking to confer powers or privileges upon existing corpo-
rations formed under the general laws, are unconstitutional. I -
Thus the power of a water company to charge tolls or rates
for the use of water being a franchise, this cannot be
granted or regulated by an act applying to a particular
place only.2
A grant of authority to reorganize a corporation by a
sale of its franchises, and the issue of new stock, etc., by
the purchasers, would seem to be practically the creation of
a new corporation, or, at any rate, a conferring of corporate
powers, and so it has been held in Ohio.3 In New York,.
the case of Mosier v. Hilton4 contained a dictum to the
effect that a special act authorizing reorganization did not
create a new corporation, but the decision itself rested on
the ground that the constitution allowed special incorpora-
tion in cases where, in the judgment of the legislature, the
object souglt could not be attained by a general law, and
that the exercise of this legislative discretion could not be
inquired into.
A grant of power to individuals, not to take effect
until they have formed a corporation, is really a grant to
such corporation when foimed, and hence cannot be made
in a State where corporate powers cannot be granted by
special act.'
Even where the prohibition of incorporation by special
act does not expressly include the amendment of charters,
it is clear that the general corporation laws, passed in con-
formity with the constitutional requirements, can only be
anended by equally general acts; 6 but it is not uniformly
settled that special charters cannot be specially amended,7
' San Francisco v. Spring Valley W. W. Co., 48 Cal., 493;, State v.
Lawrence Bridge Co., 22 Kan., 438.
- Spring Valley W. W. Co. v. Bryant, 52 Cal., 132.
3 Atkinson v. M. & C. R. Co., 15 0. St., 21.
4 15 Barb., 657.
5 San Francisco v. Spring Valley W. W. Co., 48 Cal., 493.
6 Waterloo Tpke. Rd. Co. v. Cole, 51 Cal., 381.
'See prior article on Legislative Discretion as controlled by the
Restrictions.
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and it has been held with apparent reason that a prohibi-
tion of this sort does not affect a special act authorizing a
-,corporation to surrender any of its corporate powers.1
It is held in Arkansas, Kansas and Ohio, that the
prohibition of special acts conferring corporate powers'
applies to municipal as well as private corporations, there
being no separate provision relating to the formei in the
constitutions of those States, ' but this doctrine has never
been held in NewJersey,5 and has been abandoned in Ten-
nessee.4 In Nebraska the prohibition is held to apply in
,the case of local bodies other than cities, towns and vil-
lages, for which the constitution makes special provision.'
(2) Chartering any church or religious denomination:
Virginia.
This prohibition. is general, without reference to spe-
.cial legislation; but that, and not a general law for the
incorporation of religious bodies, is clearly what- is referred
to.
(3) Changing the names of corporations: Mississippi.
III. As To RIGHTs, PRIVILEGES, DUTIES,
PROPERTY, ETC.
(i) Granting to any (private, New York) corporation,
association or individual any special or exclusive right
I P. & 0. Can. Co. v. Commrs., 27 0. St., 14.
2 Little Rock v. Parish, 36 Ark., 166; Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan., 431:
State v. Cincinnati, 20 0. St., x8; State v. Davi; 23 id., 434; State'v;
Cincinnati, id., 445; State v. Mitchell, 31 id., 607; State v. Constantine.
42 id., 437; State v. Pugh, 43 id., 9&; where, however, the Court said
"If the question were res integra, by no means could it be said to be
clear that this court would hold that Art. 13, I, of the constitution (that
forbidding special laws conferring corporate powers), has any application
to municipal corporations. But according to a series of cases, the pro-
vision does extend to municipal as well as private corporations, and
since State v. Mitchell (sup ra) this court has regarded the construction of
the constitution in that particular to be settled."
' Pell v. Newark, 4o N. J. L., 71.
4 State v. Wilson, 12 Lea (Tenn.), 246. At first the courts thought
otherwise. Luehrman v. Tax. Dist., 2 id., 431.
5 Clegg v. School Dist., 8 Neb., 178; Dundy v. Richardson Co., id.,
508.
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(except in Minnesota, New Jersey, New York), privilege or
immunity: California, Colorado, Pennsylvania; or franchise:
Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Wyoming, Territories; or amending existing
-charters for such purpose: Wyoming.
Except to a municipal corporation: Minnesota.
This provision is not violated by an act allowing the
plaintiff an attorney's fee as costs on recovery of damages
in an action against a railroad company for injury to stock
caused by defective fencing. Such an act applies through-
-out the whole State, and to all railroad companies without
-distinction, in favor of all persons whose stock is injured or
killed in this particular way.'
Nor is this provision violated by an act protecting
insurance companies from suit until ninety days after
notice of loss, this length of time being considered reason-
able in the case of such suits, owing to the peculiar char-
.acter of the claim, and the difficulty of obtaining evidence
in defence.2
A grant of a ferry right to such railroads, terminating
.at rivers on the borders of the State, as own the landing
for the water-craft employed, violates this provision,3 and
so does an act confirming the -rights of persons using and
-occupying grounds lying under tidewater for a certain pur-
pose since a given date."
Under this provision it was contended in Illinois that
-an act to regulate the practice of medicine, requiring prac-
titioners to have certain qualifications, was void, because it
excepted those who had been practicing ten years within
the State, but the court held that this proviso did not con-
fer anything upon such practitioners, but -simply left them
I Perkins vu. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 103 M o., 52. - Same point,
R. R. Co. v. Duggan, 109 Ill-, 357; see also B. C. R. & N. Ry. Co. v. Dey,
82 1o., 312.
2 Christie v. Life Indemnity Co., 82 Io., 360.
Thomas v. W. St. L. & P. R. Co., 40 Fed. Rep., 126.
4 State v. Post (N. J.), 26 Atl. Rep., 683.
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where they were.1 , The same view has since been taken
elsewhere.'
In Minnesota, the special appropriation of money out
of the treasury to pay the claims of an individual, on con-
dition of his establishing certain facts to the satisfaction of
a court, has been held not a "privilege, immunity, or
franchise,." within the meaning of the constitution,
whether such appropriation were made as a gift or in set-
tlement of an obligation.' It might, perhaps, have been
regarded as a "right," but in Minnesota (as in New Jersey
and New York) this claise makes no mention of "rights.I"
An act requiring village couhcils to designate an
official newspaper and hav the proceedings and minutes of
the council published in it, is not within this provision.'
The rights and privileges here contemplated do not,
include those which result from residence in a particular
locality or class of localities. Legislation affecting muni-
cipal corporations, -for instance, may increase the rights-
and privileges of their inhabitants, but this is not within
.this provision.5
In Ne' York an act empowering "the lessees" of
a certain ferry to acquire the title to property for an
additional ferry-slip, was held not to violate this provision.
The court was of opinion that, in the first place, this was.
not a "grant" to a private corporation, as the rights (in
this property) of the company who was then lessee would.
terminate with the'lease and pass to the succeeding lessee,
since the property could only be used for ferry purposes ;
and secondly, that at all events it was no grant of an
"exchsive privilege, immunity or franchise," because-
there was nothing to prevent the granting of a like power
to other corporations.'
1 Williams v. People, 121 Ill., 84.
2 State v. Randolph (Ore.), 31 Pac. Rep., 2oI; State v. Carey, 4.
Wash., 424.
3 Dike v. State, 38 Minn., 366.
4 State v. Cloquet Village Council (Minn.), 53 N. W. Rep., ioi6.
' Ingols v. Plimpton, 10 COl., 535.
'Matter of Un. Fer. Co., 98 N. Y., 139, reversing S. C. 32, Hun. 82..
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Special privileges granted to all companies of a par-
ticular kind, formed under general laws, are not within
this provision, because any of the citizens can form such
companies, if they wish.'
The Organic Act of Washington. Territory, now
superseded by the State constitution, forbade the terri-
torial legislature to grant special privileges. A game law
restricting the hunting in five counties was, reasonably
enough, held not to be within the prohibition, for, as the
court observed, it granted no privilege except to the. ani-
mals or to men who were fortunate enough to be alive
during the hunting season, which latter privilege was
clearly too indirect to be taken account of.' That part of
the opinion, however, which treats the law as general,
because it affected equally all persons who happened to be
at any time in those counties, is opposed to the current of
the best authorities.
Those constitutions which contain few or no restric-
tions upon special legislation usually cover this point, at
least, by a prohibition, in the, bill of rights or elsewhere,
of any legislative action either increasing or diminishing
the rights of certain individuals to the exclusion of others.
Thus in Georgia the legislature cannot vary in any partic-
ular case any general law affecting private rights, except
with the free consent in writing of all persons to be affected
thereby.3 This provision has been held to forbid a special
joint resolution fixing the amount of a public officer's
liability, and directing the government to issue executions
on such officer's bonds ;4 but it has been held not to affect
a pre-existing act, making railroad companies liable to
their officers, agents and employees for injuries sustained
by the negligence of other officers, agents or employees,.
Holmes v. Smythe, 100 Ill., 413.
2'Haynes v. Terry. 2 Wash. Ty., 286.
3 Ga. Const., Art. I, See. 4, Par. i. But this does not apply'to a law
making the tax collector in one county ex-officio sheriff for a certain
purpose, as it does not affect the sheriffs private rights: Burton v. Mor-
gan, 84 Ga., 627.
4 Mayo v. Renfroe, 66 Ga., 4o8.
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such act being general because it applied to all railroad
companies. 1 A pre-existing act, authorizing a particular
mode of service on a certain foreign corporation, and a
subsequent amendment of such as a minor point, have also
been held outside of this provision, apparently because it
was- not retroactive.
2
Ih Kansas and Ohio unalterable and irrevocable
special privileges and immunities are alone forbidden&
Hence a city charter can confer authority over the streets,
whereby the city can itself authorize a railroad company
to lay down tracks in them, the authority so granted to
the city being, of course, revocable.4
The consolidation of corporations, b eing the formation
of a new corporation, a corporation so formed is subject to
this provision, even though those of which it was formed
were not. Hence if a railroad company, chartered under
a, former constitution with no restriction on its rates of
fare, consolidates with another, the rates which the new
company is allowed to charge can be lowered by a general
law.'
The Kentucky constitution of I 85o' declares that "no
man or set of men are entitled to exclusive separate emolu-
ments or privileges from the community but in considera-
tion of public services." The Supreme Court of that State
held that a grant of an exclusive right to manufacture and
supply gas in a city violates this provision, as the lighting
of the streets is not a public service, but within the con-
trol of the municipality,7 but this was reversed by the Su-
preme Court of the United States." An act empowering a
trust company to sell land in the foreclosure of motgages,
without the intervention of the court, was also held void,
I Ga. R. & B. Co. z,. Oaks, 62 Ga., 410.
2 N. & C. R.. Co. v. McMahon, 70 Ga., .585.
3 Kan. Const., B. of Rts.,. SeC. 2; 0. Const., Art. I, SeC. 2.
Atch. S. R. Co. v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 3 Kan., 66o.
5 Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S., 39.
6 Art. XIII, i.
Citizens G. L. Co. v. Louisville Gas Co., 81 Ky., 263.8 Louisville Gas 0b. v. Citizens G. L. Co., 115 U. S., 683.
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thae company having performed no public service to the
State,' This provision has been held not to affect grants of
strictly private privileges, and hence a grant of the right to-
hold a lottery (lotteries being forbidden by the general law).
has been upheld in Kentucky.'
In South Carolina it is provided that no person shall
be subjected in law to any other restraint or disqualifica-
"tion in regard to his personal rights than such as are laid
upon others under like circumstances. 3 Hence while a cer-
tain county may be excepted from the provisions of a gen-
eral stock law, such special exception cannot be made to-
affect a certain citizen only to the exclusion of others, ac-
cording as they may or may not have conformed to the-
general law, the fact of such conformity being held too-
trivial to constitute any real difference in circumstances.4
In South Dakota it is provided that "no law shall be-
passed granting to any citizens, class of citizens, or corpo--
rations, privileges and immunities which upon the same-
terms shall not equally belong to all citizens or corpora-
tions." This has been held to invalidate a law for the.
organization and government of State banks, prohibiting-
the business of banking from being carried on in any town,
of 500 inhabitants or over, except after compliance with
the act and organization under it.5
In Tennessee it is provided that "the legislature shall
have no power to suspend a general law for the benefit of
any particular individual 6 [Alabama, Arkansas and Mis-
sissippi have the same provision and extend it to corpora-
tions and associations],J nor to pass any law for the benefit of
individuals inconsistent with the general laws of the land ;
nor to pass any law granting to individuals rights, privi-
leges, immunities or exceptions other than'such as may be-
' Kentucky Trust Co. v. Lewis, 82 Ky., 579.
2 Commonwealth v. Whipps, 80 Ky., 269.
3 Const. S. C., Art. I., P 12.
Utsey v. Hiott, 20 S. C., 26o.
5 State v. Scongal (S. Dak.), 51 N. W. Rep., 8S8.
6 This does not apply to municipal corporations: Williams v. Nash-
ville, 87 Tenn., 487.
7 Const. Ala., Art. IV, 23; Const. Ark., Art. V, 25.
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by the same law extended to any other member of the com-
munity who may be able to bring himself within the pro-
visions of such law." ' This has been held to forbid an act
making it a misdemeanor punishable by fine, to make bet-
ting, books or sell pools on any race, except by authority of a
lawfully chartered turf, fair or other like association, avd then
only in the county in which the association or fair was
located, such act being regarded as creating a new privilege.
2
Under this same provision an act forbidding any per-
son engaged in the business of a barber to shave, shampoo,
etc., or keep open his bath-room on Sunday, was held void,
because it operated as a restriction upon barbers only, and
incidentally conferred a privilege upon all other people.3
But an election law, applicable only to counties of over
70,000 inhabitants, and to cities with a population of over
9ooo, has been held not to violate this provision, because
no county or city could be said to be permanently excluded
from its provisions, all of them being theoretically capable
of eventually reaching the required number of inhabitants.4
(2) Changing the law of descent: California, Colo-
rado, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Da-
kota, West Virginia, Wyoming, Territories; of descent
and succession: Mississippi; of descent, distribution or suc-
cession: Kentucky.
An act affecting the descent of real estate to non-resi-
dent aliens is not special, even though its operation is lim-
ited to those not protected by treaties.'
(3) Affecting the estates of minors or other persons
under disability: California, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Missouri, Montana, North Dakota (except after notice to
all parties in interest, Pennsylvania), Texas, Wyoming; or
deceased persons: California, Kentucky, Montana, North
Dakota, Wyoming; or cesluis que trus/ent: Kentucky.
Providing for the sale or conveyance (or leasing, en-
1 Const. Tenn., Art. XI, 8.
2 Daly v. State, 13 Lea. (Tenn.), 228.
3 Ragio v. State, 86 Tenn., 272.
Cook v. State, 90 Tenn., 407.
Wunderle v. Wunderle (11.), 33 N. W. Rep., 195.
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cumbering or other disposition, Kentucky) of the real estate
of minors or other persons under disability: California or
of decedents, Florida, Kentucky), Illinois, Indiana, Mary-
land, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, West "
Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Territories; or the
mortgage of the same: Colorado, Minnesota, Montana, Ne-
braska, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Washing-
ton, West Virginlia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Territories by
executors, administrators, guardians and trustees: Indiana,
Maryland, Oregoni.
Concerning the settlement or administration of any
estate, or sale or mortgage of any property of ny infant, or
of a person of unsound mind, or of a deceased person: Mis-
sissippi. .- .I
Authorizing any minor to sell, lease or encumber his .
or her propeity: California, Idaho, Washington.
A provision of the above character, as contained inthe
Kentucky constitution of 185o, has been held not to affect
an act granting the Louisville Chancery Court power to cor-
rect errors or permit amendments in any case-which had been'
or should be brought before it for the sale of minors' real
estate, even after the decree had been made and the sale
had taken place. The act was decided not to be an attempt
to sell such real estate by special legislation, but to be
a law of general import, to authorize the perfecting of irreg-
ular proceedings which had been intended to comply with
the general act, but through inadvertence failed to do so.'
The phrase "other persons under disability"I does not
include associations, nor probably persons in prison or out
of the State.'
1 Marshall v. Marshall, 4 Bush. (Ky.), 248. It is to be observed that
the act, though in certain respects general, concerned proceedings in a
court of local jurisdiction, and was therefore unquestionably a local law,
but this point does not seem to have been raised. The Kentucky con-
stitution did not in terms prohibit local legislation in regard to sales of
infants' real estate, but it did require such matters to be regulated by the
courts under general laws.
'Haps v. Hewitt, 97 Ill., 498.
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In New York there is no restriction upon special legis-
lation authorizing the sale of infants' real estate.'
(4) Authorizing the sale of church property, or pro-
perty held for a charitable use: West Virginia.
(5) Authorizing or providing for the sale or conveyance
of any real estate: Michigan.
This has been held not to apply to a law authorizing
a road company to mortgage its road.'
(6) Giving effect to informal or invalid deeds: Colo-
rado, Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming - deeds, -leases, or
other instruments: Idaho; deeds or wills: Florida, Mary-
land, Texas; deeds, wills or other instruments: California,
Kentucky, Washington; deeds, wills or any illegal disposi-
tion of property : Louisiana.
(7) Remitting fines,%penalties, or forfeitures: Califor-
-nia, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wyom-
ing, Territories.
(8) Releasing or extinguishing, in whole or in part,
the indebtedness, liability, or obligation of any corporation
or person to the State or any municipal corp6ration: Cali-
fornia, Idaho,3 Montana, North Dakota, Washington,
Wyoming.
In South Dakota this prohibition is made without
reference to special legislation, but it can hardly have any
other application.
Releasing from debts due the State, unless recommended
by the governor or the treasury department: Maryland.
A collateral inheritance tax law, ,with a proviso'that it
should apply to all cases where the tax had been already
claimed of the husband of any decedent, but not actually
' See Brevoort v. Grace, 53 N. Y., 245; In re Field, 17 N. Y. Supp.,
'9.
2 Joy v. J. & M. P1. R. Co., ir Mich., 155.
3 In Idaho the prohibition, as printed, concerns the indebtedness,
etc., of any corporation or person " in the State or any municipal cor-
poration therein," but this would seem to be a printer's or copyist's
error.
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paid by him, was held not to be a special release of other
parties from debts due by them to the State.1
(9) Refunding money paid into the State treasury:
California, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota; money legally
so paid: Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, Wyoming.
(Io) Auditing or allowing any private claim or account:
Michigan.
(II) Authorizing suits against the State, or making
compensation to any person claiming damages against the
State : Oregon.
(12) Exempting property from taxation: California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota,,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Wyoming; or from levy or sale:
Mississippi.
(13) Releasing taxes or titles to forfeited lands, or
authorizing deeds to be madt for lands sold for taxes: West
Virginia.
(14) Exempting any person from jury, road or other
civil duty (and no person shall .be exempted therefrom by'
force of any local or private law): Mississippi.
IV. As TO INTEREST, LIENS, TRADE, ETC.
(I) Regulating the rate of interest : California, Colo-
rado, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota,..
Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming, Territories.
The rate established by the legislature to be equal and
uniform throughout the State: Tennessee.
The restriction of special legislation as to the rate of
interest applies only to contests between individuals, and
not to taxes. A special rate of penalties for non-payment
of taxes and assessments is valid, 2 and even when imposed
by a local law.3
An act providing that no premiums, fines, or interest
M ontague v. State, 54 Md., 481.
2 People v. Peacock, 98 II., 172; McChesney 7.. People, 99 id., 216.
3 New Orleans v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 41 La. Ann., 1142.
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on premiums of building associations should be deemed
- usurious, has been held not within this provision, the
premiums, etc., being in the nature of liquidated damages
for failure to comply with the contract.'
(2) Authorizing the creation, extension (enforcement
or release: Kentucky) or impairing of liens: California,
,Idaho, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Penn-
'sylvania, Texas.
The character of a lien not differing with regard to
locality, lien laws for any particular class of localities are
local -and invalid; 2 bdt an act authorizing liens to be filed
for paving assessments in cities of a certain class is valid,
street paving being a matter of municipal concern, and
.hence capable of being regulated as to all its details, by
separate laws for each class of cities' and the same is true
o'f municipal taxes°
An ct, providing, however, that taxes or other claims
in cities of a certain class shall become liens without the
same procedure required in other cases, is local,5 and the
same is probably true of an act making tax liens perpetual
in a class of cities.6
(3) Regulating trade, labor, mining, or manufactuthig:
(agriculture, not mining: Louisiana) Kentucky, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, Texas.
An act providing that no boatload of coal, coke, etc.,
should be sold anywhere in the State, until it had been
iispected is general, and not a special regulation of trade.
7
(4) For the protection of game or fish : Colorado, Illi-
. .nois, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, Territories.
Local laws for this purpose are expressly allow~d by
the Texas constitution.
1 Holmes v. Smythe, 100 Ill., 413; Freeman v. Ottawa B. A., 114 id.,
182; Winget v. Quincy B. A., 128 id., 67.
2 Davis v. Clark, io6 Pa., 377; Phila. v. Haddington, 115 Pa., 291.
3 Scranton v. Whyte, 148 Pa., 419.
'Smith v. Meadow Brook Brewing Co., 3 Lack. Jur. (Pa.) 145.
6 Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Fricke, 152 Pa., 231.
6 Philadelphia v. Kates, i6o Pa., 3o.
7 State v. P. &. S.'C. Co., 41 La. Ann., 405.
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V. As TO EMINENT DOMIAIN, RAILROADS,
BRIDGES, FERRIES, ETC.
(I) Granting to any person or corporation the right
to lay down a railroad track: (or tramway: Kentucky)
Colorado Missouri, New Jersey, New York,' North Dakota,
Pennsylvania; or amending existing charters for such
purposes : Illinois, Kentucky, Nebraska, Wyoming,
Territories.
Conferring the power to exercise the right of eminent
domain, or granting to any person, corporation, or associa-
tion the right to lay down railroad tracks in any other
manner than that prescribed by general law: Mississippi.
Authorizing the construction of street passenger rail-
roads in any incorporated town or city: Louisiana.
Such a right cannot be granted as an enlargement of
corporate powers already possessed. An act granting the
right to construct a railway in tubes of a certain. size, at a
certain distance from the curb-line and* building-line, can-
not be so amended as to give a right to construct railways
without tubes, and occupying far more space.'
An act authorizing the council of a particular city to
vacate a certain street for the purpose of the erection of a
railway station by a particular railroad company, has been
held not to grant any right to lay down tracks, nor to con-
fer any exclusive privilege, but at most only to give the
council additional power, a thing not forbidden by the
constitution.3
(2) Relating to (or licensing) ferries and bridges, and
chartering ferry and bridge companies: (ferries only: Flor-
ida) Louisiana,. Missouri, Pennsylvania, Texas; ferries
and toll-bridges: Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, West Vir-
ginia, Territories; ferries, bridges and roads: California;
ferries, bridges and toll-roads: Montana; ferries, toll-
bridges and toll-roads: North Dakota; chartering or licens-
1 This includes elevated railroads, People v,. Loew., 102 N. Y., 471.
2 Astor v. N. Y. Arcade R. Co., 113 N. Y., 93.
sVeinckie v. N. Y. C., &c., R. R. Co., 68 S. C. N. Y., 6r9.
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ing ferries, bridges or (toll: Wyoming) roads: Idaho,
Wyoming-
Licensing companies or persons to own or operate fer-
ries, bridges, roads or turnpikes; affecting toll-gates or reg-
ulating tolls: Kentucky.
Establishing bridges and ferries: Georgia.
Providing for building bridges, and chartering com-
panies for such purposes: New York.
- Authorizing any person to keep ferries over streams
wholly within the State: Minnesota, South Dakota, Wash-
, ington, Wisconsin.
Granting to any person, corporation or association, the
right to have any ferry, bridge, road or fish-trap: Mis-
sissippi.
Except over streams which bound the State: Loui-
giana, Missouri (or the East River or the Hudson below
'Waterford: New York), Pennsylvania, Texas.
By a provision.of this character the legislature is for-
bidden to charter license or establish a ferry, directly or
lihdirectly, by special laws.1
But in New York, where providing for the building of
bridges is alone prohibited, an act legalizing the action of
a town board and its officers, in regard to the payment for
a certain bridge, has been held not within the restriction.2
(3) Relating to stock laws, water-courses or fences:
' Mississippi.
Regulating fencing or the running at large of stock:
Kentucky.
(4) Declaring streams navigable, or authorizing the
construction of booms or dams therein, or to remove
obstructions therefrom: Kentucky.
VI. As TO LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.
(i) Regulating the practice' and jurisdiction (and cir-
Frye v. Partridge, 82 Ill., 267.
.'
2 Wrought Iron Bridge Co. v. Attica, 56 S. C. N. Y., 513.
3 By the Kentucky constitution the practice of circuit courts in con-
tinuous session may, by a general law, be made different from that of
circuit courts held in terms.
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cuits.: Kentucky) of courts: Kentucky, Louisiana, Mis-
souri, Pennsylvania, Texas; the practice only: California, ""
Colorado (except municipal courts: Florida), Illinois, hi-
diana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Dakota, Oregon, West Virginia, Kentucky, Territories.
"The practice in courti of justice" means the form,
manner and order of conducting and carrying on suits and
prosecutions, civil and criminal. Hence, an act creating-
a court, and conferring jurisdiction upon it, does not un-
dertake to regulate practice;1 and an act regulating the
terms of court in certain counties has been held 'to affed
neither* practice nor jurisdiction;2 but "practice" in
this sense is held to include pleading.' A regulation of"
the practice in all of a particular, class of cases is not
special; and, hence, a law requiring an affidavit of defence .
on the merits to be filed with a.'demurrer to attaqhment
proceedings against water craft, does not violate the iestric.
tion of special laws concerning practice.' By parity of
reasoning an act authorizing any surety company to he
accepted as sole and sufficient security, on appeal, ' or one "' '
providing for the dissolution of insurance companies on..
insolvency,6 applying as it does to all such companieS, is
not a special regulation in regard to practice; and' tbe•
same is true of a mechanic's lien law.7 ') .
This provision is violated by an act providing that iif'."
a particular criminal court no special judges should be:.
elected or selected from the members of the bat to sit on:
the trial of a cause on account of the incompetency of the'
judge, but that in such a case the judge might, by order of
the court, set the cause down for trial, and request th6 °
judge of another court to try it.S
Combs v. State, 26 Ind., 98.
- CoX v. State, 8 Tex. App., 254.
:People v. Cent. Pac. R. R. Co., 83 Cal., 393.
'Johnson v. C. & P. El. Co., 105 Ill., 462.
Cramer v. Tittle, 72 Cal., 12.
Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor, IOt Ill., 82.
'Summerlin v. Thompson (Fla.), 12 So. Rep., 667.
State v. Kring, 74 Mo., 612.
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Under this prqvision the practice cannot be different
in any class of localities from what it is elsewhere in" the
* State, because the right to avail oneself of the machinery
of the law is a personal one, in no way affected by the
-character of a man's place of residence.'
Moreover, the practice cannot differ in regard to mat-
ters which do not materially differ among themselves.
Thus, a special form of complaint in actions to collect
- taxes on railroads situate in more than one county is inad-
* missible under this provision, and an act providing f6r
* such form of oinplaint is special, even though found in a
general code. The fact that the constitution of California
provides a special method of assessing for taxation the
'property of such railroads has been held not to affect the
matter.'
A.n act requiring the plaintiff in an action for slander
or libel to file an undertaking, with sureties, is not special.
3
The constitutions of Colorado, Illinois and Nebraska
contain a general provision in regard to courts (expressed
in almost indentical language in each case) to the follow-
ing effect:
I "All laws relating to courts shall be general, and of
uniform operation throughout the State, and the organiza-
tion, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings, and practice of all
courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated by
law, and the force and effect of the proceedings, judg-
filents, and decrees of such courts severally, shall be
uniform." 1 4
An act regulating the practice of all courts of record
in the State (e. g., creating a "short cause calendar," and
giving such causes precedence) is not special within the
meaning of this provision,5 which has also been held not
I Ruan Street, 132 Pa., 257, 277.
2 People v. Cent. Pac. R. -R. Co., 83 Cal., 393.
3 Smith v. McDermott, 93 Cal., 421.
4 Const. Col., Art. VI, 28; Const. ll, Art. VI, 29; Const. Neb., Art.
VI, 19; see Xilian v. Clark, 9 Ill. App., 426.
5 Jensen v. Fricke, 133 III., 771; L. N. A: & C. R. R. Co. v. Wallace,
136 id., 87.
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to cover a law conferring upon the Denver authorities
power exclusively to prohibit and suppress dance houses,
etc., because such a law does not deal with courts or their
jurisdictions, but simply grants the city council certain
police powers.' Nor does this provision forbid an act ex-
empting all municipal corporations from giving bond on
taking appeals.' An act creating superior courts in cities
and incorpated towns, and giving them a jurisdiction dif-
ferent from that of the district courts, is also outside the
scope of this provision, because the superior and district
courts are not of the same class or grade.3
Under this provision there may be different classes of
police courts, and if a statute in regard to any class be
applicable to all cities of the size designated, it is valid ; 4
but the legislature cannot give the county courts concur-
rent jurisdiction with the circuit courts as to certain kinds
of cases, in counties where probate courts are or may be
established. County courts constitute a class of courts,
and those in counties containing probate courts form a
part of this class only, arid cannot be legislated for by
themselves. '
A law limiting the number of the justices of the peace
in cities of the first class to three, to be elected by the
voters of certain districts to be created by the county com-
missioners, affects neither the organization of justice's
courts nor their jurisdiction, power, etc., but only the
method of selecting the persons whose duty it shall be to
exercise the functions of courts, a matter apparently not
within the above provision.
6
Uniformity in the jurisdiction and powers of courts is
also required by the Georgia constitution, but this does not
prevent special legislation establishing courts in .one or
Rogers v. People, 9 Col., 450.
McClay v. Lincoln, 32 Neb., 412.
3 Darrow v. People, 8 Col., 417; Ingols v. Plimpton, io id., 535.
M cInerney v. Denver, 17 Col., 302.
5 Klokke v. Dodge, io3 Ill., 125.
' State v. Berka, 2o Neb., 375.
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more counties, provided the jurisdiction and powers are in
conformity with the general act.'
(2) Regulating the rights, powers, duties or compen-
sation of the officers of courts: Kentucky.
(3) Regulating the jurisdiction and duties of alder-
man, justices of the peace, police justices (or magistrates)
and ,constables: California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana,
* Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Wyoming, Territories;
justices of the peace and constables: Indiana, Nevada,
Oregon.
. Regulating the practice or jurisdiction of alderman,
justices of the peace, commissioners, arbitrators, etc.:
Missouri, Pennsylvania, Texas.
Regulating the fees, or extending the powers and
dufies of alderman, justices of the peace, magistrates or
constables: Missouri, Pennsylvania, Texas.
The above provision as to fees is infringed by an act
allowing prothonotaries and sheriffs within six years after
. the expiration of their terms to sue for their fees before jus-
tices of the peace, such act being designed for a particular
purpose and applicable only to particular persons, and to
them for a limited period only.2
Uniformity as to the jurisdiction and duties of justices
of the peace is further secured in Illinois by a special pro-
vision of the constitution. Taking both provisions together,
the uniformity required is held to include territorial uni-
formity, territory being essential to jurisdiction. Hence,
though justices' districts need not be uniform in size, they
must consist of counties or townships, not both. If the
county be the basis of jurisdiction, one county cannot be
divided into two districts.3
(4) Concerning any civil or criminal action: Louisiana.
I Lorentz v. Alexander, 87 Ga., 444.
2 Strine v. Foltz, i13 Pa., 349.
3 People v. Mee.h, 101 Ill., 200. Besides the failure of the act, under
review in that case, to secure unif6rmity, it was also special in that it
changed the existing laws as to one couuty only (that in which two dis-
tricts were established), so that it was practically a law for that county
alone.
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(5) Punishing any crimes or misdemeanors: Califor-
nia, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada,
North Dakota, Oregon, Wyoming, Territories,
A penal law forbidding the transaction of business on
Sunday, except that of hotels, boarding houses, barber
shops, etc., is not made a special law by this exception.'
(6) Changing the venue in any criminal action: Ar-
kansas; civil or criminal: California, Colorado, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wyo-
ming, Territories.
An act permitting changes of venue from the St.
Louis Criminal Court for any cause for which such changes"
may -be allowed from other criminal courts of the State,
was held to violate the above clause ;2 but it may be
questioned whether this particular feature of the act, con-
forming the practice of one criminal court to that of other
like courts, was not, in its spirit, general legislation.
(7) Changing the rules-of evidence in any judicial pro-
ceeding or inquiry: Colorado, Louisiana, Missouri, Mon-
tana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wyoming.
This provision has been held in Missouri to refer only
to a change of the rules of evidence with respect t6 causes
pending when the change is made, not to any change in
the rules in regard to particular matters as to which special
legislation is allowed, and hence not to apply to special
municipal charters which provided that in the case of im-
p'rovements the assessment bills should be frizafacie evi-
dence that the work was done for which the assessment
was made.3
(8) Providing or changing methods for the collection
of debts and enforcement of judgments, and prescribing
the effect of judicial sales: Louisiana, Missouri, Pennsyl-
vania, Texas.
I Expare Koser, 6o Cal., 187.
2 State v. Kring, 74 Mo., 612.
3 Eyerman v. Blaksley, 78 Mo., I45.
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This provision is not violated in. Texas by a special
charter, exempting the city incorporated thereby from lia-
bility to garnishment proceedings, the constitution of Texas
allowing special charters for cities of over Io,ooo inhabi-
tants, and all the restrictions on special legislation con-
tained therein being subject to the proviso, "except as
otherwise provided in this constitution."'
An act allowing an attorney's fee to be recovered as
costs, 'on small claims against railroad companies for stock
killed, is sufficiently general, and is not a special law chang-
ing the method. of collecting debts.'
(9) Prescribing limitations of civil actions :3 Montana,
North Dakota, Wyoming; or criminal actions: Colorado,
Missouri; or both: California, Idaho, Kentucky, Texas,
Washington.
A statute of limitations excepting actions on *contracts
already executed is general.'
(io) Summoning or empanelling grand or petit jurors:
California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky,
Nebraska North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, West Virginia,
Wyoming, Territories; and providing for their compensa-
tion: California, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska.
Selecting, drawing, summoning or empanelling them:
Mississippi, New Jersey, New York.5"
Under a provision of this character, a law providing
that in .certain counties the grand juries shall contain more
members than in others is void,6 but an act for the empan-
'Dallas v. Western Electric Co. (Tex.), i8 S. W. Rep., 552, 21 id., 933.
2 G. C. &S. F. R. R. Co. v. Ellis, (Tex.), 18 S. W. Rep.,. 723.
3 An act limiting the time for the enforcement of the liability of
municipalities and townships on their subscriptions in aid of railroads is
not a special statute of limitations for the benefit of particular corpora-
tions and applicable to a single class of municipal contracts: People v.
Granville, 104 II1., 285. The constitution of Illinois, under which this
decision was rendered, does not specifically forbid special statutes of lim-
itations, but the contention may have been that the act violated the pro-
visions in regard to the practice and jurisdiction of courts or in regard to
cases where a general law could be made applicable.
4 McKean v. Archer, 52 Fed. Rep., 791.
5 See People v. Petrea, 92 N. Y., 128.
6 Territory v. Baca, (N. M.), 30 Pac. Rep., 864.
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elling of two different juries, one to serve on the part of the
United States for the district, and one to serve on the part
of the territory for the county, is general, as it applies to the
whole territory.'
,VII. As TO MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, AND LOCAL
ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNMENT.
(I) Incorporating villages, cities and towns, and
amending their charters: Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota (except cities
of over io,ooo inhabitants: Texas), West Virginia, Territo-
ries; cities and towns: Mississippi; villages and towns:
Washington, Wisconsin.
Incorporating cities and towns: Iowa.
Organizing cities, towns and villages: Kansas.
Incorporating villages: New York.
Under the constitution of California, corporations for
municipal purposes cannot be created by special laws, and
the legislature is required to provide by general laws for
the incorporation and organization of cities and towns and
their classification in proportion to population, the method
of incorporation being prescribed in the constitution.2
In Colorado, general laws for the organization and
classification of cities and towns are required.
It is held in Arkansas, Kansas and Ohio that the pro-
hibition of special acts conferring corporate powers applies
to municipal as well as private corporations 3 (and so in Ne-
braska, as to local bodies, other than villages, cities and
towns),' bat the reverse is held in New Jersey and Ten-
niessee.5
In the constitutions of Alabama, Georgia, Maine,
I U. S. v. De Amador, (N. M.), 27 Pac. Rep., 488.
2 Cal. Const., Art. XI, 6; see Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal., 73.
3 Little Rock v. Parish, 36 Ark., x66; Topeka vz. Gillett, 32 Kan., 431;
State v. Cincinnati, 20 0. St., 18 ; State v. Davis, 23 id., 434; State v.
Cincinnati, id., 445; State v. Mitchell, 31 id., 607; State v. Constantine,
42 id., 437; State v. Pugh, 43 id., 98.
'Clegg v. School Dist.', 8 Neb., 178; Dundy v. Richardson Co.,
id., 5o8.
5 Pell v. Newark, 4o N.J. L., 7r ; State v. Wilson, 12 Lea(Tenn.), 246.
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Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New York and- Oregon
municipal corporations are expressly excepted from the
prohibition of special legislation; and the same exception
occurs as to cities in the Wisconsin constitution, and in
that of Louisiana as to the city of New Orleans and the
organization of levee districts and parishes.'
It is held in Illinois that the words I Ivillages, cities
and towns" are not meant to cover every sort of public
corporation for administrative purposes, and hence that a
* sanitary district or a drainage district may be incorporated
by special act, and different systems for the construction,
maintenance and repair of drains and sewers may be pro-
yided.2
Under -the prohibition stated above all grants of cor-
porate powers to particular municipal corporations are held
. invalid. Thus an act authorizing a city to appoint a board
of control,3 transferring a city from one class to another, or
allowing a city of one class to incorporate as of another
class,- is void; and this rule has been applied to the increase
or reduction of the area of a city, such change necessarily
contracting or enlarging the sphere of municipal jurisdic-
tion, and constituting in effect an amendment of the
charter.' Thus in Little Rock v. Parish' the court said:
"It is literally true that such action [reduction of area]
would confer no power whatever, but constitutions, like
statutes and private writings, are to be construed according
to their plain intent, derived from the language and con-
text. Of what avail would it be to prohibit the legislature
from conferring corporate powers upon favorite municipal-
ities, if it might first confer them by general acts on all in
1 See supra.
2 Owners of Lands v. People, .I3 Ill., 296; Wilson v. Trustees, 133
* id., 443.
1 State v. Pugh, 43 O St., 98.
4 Brown v. Millikef, 43 Kan., 769.
5 Little Rock v. Parish, 36 Ark., 166; Gray v. Crockett, 30 Kan., 138;
State v. Cincinnati, 2o 0. St., x8; see also People v. San Diego, 85 Cal.,
369.
6 36 Ark., 166.
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the State, and then by special acts trim down to a general
level and shackle all not meant to be favored? Besides, a
distinction in this regard between a power to increase and
a power to diminish the area of cities can be rested on no
plausible foundation of reason," the constitution indicating
an intention that all municipalities of the same class
should be on the same footing as to their mode of creation,
acquisition of increased territory, powers of government,
etc." In Ohio, however, detaching part of the territory
of a municipal corporation and attaching it to an adjoining
township is held to be outside the prohibition of\ the con-,
ferring.of corporate powers by special act.'
Legalizing an unauthorized issue of city bonds, how-
ever, confers no corporate power, but merely recognizes the
city's existing legal obligation to repay the money received
for the bonds, and provides a means for enforcing thdt
obligation.
2
The general prohibition of special laws conferring
corporate power is not usually hela to apply to grants of
power to counties and local bodies which are not strictly
corporations. Thus, in Arkansas, a special law in regard
to the issuing of county bonds was sustained, a county
being held not to be a corporation, but merely a political
division of the State invested, for some purposes of local
government, with a few functions characteristic of cor-
porate existence.3
Similarly in Kansas, the Topeka Board of Education
being regarded as a quasi corporation only, an act authoriz-
ing it to issue bonds for new school buildings was held not'
to confer corporate powers.4 In Ohio it has been held that
no corporate powers were conferred by an act authorizing
the Court of Common Pleas of one county to appoint three
commissioners with power to appoint, control and disci-
pline the police force of Xenia, and to that end to
'Metcalf v. State (0.), 31 N. E. Rep., 1076.
2Read v. Plattsmouth, 107 U. S., 568.
3 Pulaski Co. vz. Reeve, 42 Ark., 54.
4 Knowles v. Board of Education, 33 Kan., 692.
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become an organized body, to make rules for their own
government, etc.;' nor by an act authorizing. county
commissioners to grant further time for the completion of
free turnpike roads, and providing for the payment for the
same;' nor by an act authorizing the sinking fund trustees
of a city to re-district it.3 And so it has been held in Min-
nesota of an act authorizing a board of water-commissioners
to contract for water-works in their own name, as the
representative of the city, the'contract being held to be
made in substance and effect with the city as well as
for it. 4"
In Nebraska, on the other hand, corporate powers
were held to be conferred by acts authorizing a school
district to build a school-house and issue bonds to pay for
it,5 and authorizing a city precinct to issue bonds for the
construction of a court-house, and to assess taxes therefor.6
But in the same State an act prescribing the- boundaries
of a new county, and providing the machinery for its
organization, was held not strictly to confer corporate
powers, but rather to provide the means whereby they
might be exercised,' and the Supreme Court of the United
States has sustained a Nebraska statute, authorizing a
county to issue bonds in payment of a valid debt previ-.
ously contracted.'
As to what constitute "municipal purposes," for
which in some States special incorporation is allowed, it
has been held that the improvement of the. navigation of
certain rivers, on which certain cities are situated, is a
municipal purpose, and the creation for that purpose, of a
corporation composed of those cities, with power to borrow
money and levy taxes, is within the exception.9
I State v. Baughman, 38 0. St,, 455.
2'Foster v. Commissioners, 9 0. St., 540.
3 State v. Pugh, 43 0. at., 98.
4 Morton v. Power, 33 Minn., 521.
'Clegg v. School Dist., 8 Neb., 178.
Dundy v. Richardson Co., 8 Neb., 5o8.
State v. Piper, 17 Neb., 614.
Sherman Co. v. Simons, 1o9 U. S., 735.
9 Cook v. Port of Portland, 20 Ore., 58o.
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(2) Providing for the bonding of cities, towns, pre-
cincts, school districts or other municipalities: West
Virginia.
(3) Erecting new counties, townships or boroughs,
changing their lines of limits,' or changing school districts:
Pennsylvania.
Changing county lines: Georgia; except in the crea-
tion of new counties: Washington.
Erecting new townships, or changing the lines of
townships or school districts: Missouri.
(4) Locating or changing county seats (changing only:
California, Minnesota, Washington 2), Colorado, Idaho, Illi-
nois, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, Territories.
Unless the law authorizing the change shall require
that two-thirds of the legal votes cast at a general or
special election shall designate the place to which the
county seat shall be changed. _Provided, that the power
to pass a special law shall cease as long as the legislature
shall provide for such change by general law. Provided
further, that no special law shall be passed for any one
county oftener than once in six years: Idaho.
The.legislature cannot pass an act to. relocate county
seats in counties where they have been located by a vote
of less than a majority of all the electors voting, thereon,3
nor in counties where, at the time of the act, the court-
house and jail are not worth $35,000, such classifications
not being .permissible.4
It has been held in lVlorida that locating a county seat
I For a general law, amending a possibly b.cal act'as to the limits of
boroughs see In re Pottstown, 117 Pa., 538.
2 In the Washington constitution the lang-vage is, "locating county
seats, providing this shall not be construed to apply to the creation of
new counties." This clearly refers to "changing" county seats, as dis-
tinguished from " locating" them, a term used in the other constitu-
tions in the case of new counties only.
3 Adams v. Smith, 6 Dak., 94.
4 Edmonds v. Herbrandson kN. D.), 5o N. W. Rep., 970.
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is not regulating county affairs, and hence that special.
legislation as to the former, not being expressly forbidden,
is not unconstitutional; 1 but in Indiana such location or
changp has been considered a matter to which a general
la*w can be made applicable, and, therefore, not a proper
subject for special legislation.2 Where a county seat can-
not be changed except by a vote of the citizens acting
under a general law, a law passed to regulate elections to
decide the question must be uniform, and cannot provide
for a. majority vote under certain circumstances, and a
three-fifths vote under others.'
(5) Regulating county or township business: Cali-
fornia, Idaho, Indiana, Nevada; county or township
affairs: Colorado, Florida,4 Illinois, Montana, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Wyoming, Territories; the affairs of cities,
counties, townships, wards and school districts: Misssouri
(and boroughs: Pennsylvania), Texas.
Regulating the internal affairs of towns and counties,
or appointing local officers or commissioners to regulate
municipal affairs: New Jersey. The word "towns" has
been held to include cities.
6
,egulating or changing county or district affairs: West
Virginia.
"Business" was the term first used in provisions of the
foregoing character, and has been defined in Indiana as
"the conduct of such affairs as usually engage the atten-
.tion of township and county officers," and as not including
any act which, if it can be done at all, can only be done in
a particular case and by authority of a special law. In this
1 State v. Sumter Co. Commrs., 19 Fla., 518,
2 Thomas v'. Clay Co. Commrs., 5 Ind., 4.
'Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn., 264.
But not those of cities or towns:. State v. Duval Co. Commrs., 23
. la., 483.
5 But not poor districts: Jenks Tp. v. Sheffield Tp., 135 Pa., 400. In
that case the question whether, as each county constituted a poor dis-
trict, any law regulating the affairs of a poor district was not really a
law as to the affairs of counties was not decided.
6 Van Riper v. Parsons, 4o N. J. L., i; Bingham v. Camden, id., s56;
Pell v. Newark, id., 55o; Reid v. Wiley, 46 id., 473.
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sense the restriction does not" cover the case of reimburse-
ment to a public officer who has personally supplied lost
funds, nor to any other special grant of relief,' nor to a
special act creating a particular court;' whereas in Colorado
and Pennsylvania acts authorizing sessions of a county
court, away from the county seat, have been viewed as
regulating county "affairs," 3 The word "affairs" seems
to have been designedly used in the later constitutions as a
wider significance than " business." In Pennsylvania it
was first stated to mean in this connection "matters relat-
ing to government," I but later it has been defined as
including not merely such affairs as concern the cities and
counties in their governmental or corporate capacity, but
all those which concern the people of the respective cities
and counties.5 Hence an act regulating the fees of courts
and administrative officers in certain counties has been held
to touch the affairs of those counties, because every one of-
their citizens may be affected by such regulation, and all
who -have official dealings with them must be.6  Even.
taking the word "affairs" in the narrower sense abovi
given, it covers the case of a law for the payment of claims
against a county or township. The appropriation of county
funds thereby niade, or the levy of a tax thereby provided
for, the imposition of duties upon local officers, etc., are all
regulations of the affairs of the locality.
7
On the other hand, an act increasing the powers of
married women over certain kinds of property owned by
them, including the loans of a particular city, is not a
1 Blount v. State, 20 Ind., 29.
2 E tel v. State, 33 Ind., ioI.
3 Coulter v. Routt Co., 9 Col., 258; Comth. v. Patton, 88 Pa., 258;
Scowden's App., 96 id., 422. Acts authorizing special sessions" of court
were upheld in Cooper v. Mills Co., 69 Ia., 350; Whallon v. Circuit
Judge, 51 Mich., 5o5, there-being no constitutional provision to the con-
trary. .
'Montgomery v. Comth., 91 Pa., 125.
5 Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa., 322.
6 Ibid.
7 Williams v. Bidleman, 7 Nev., 68; Freeholders v. Buck, 51 N.J. I.,
155; Montgomery v. Comth., 91 Pa., 125.
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regulation of the affairs of such city, but "of the mode of
transfer cif certain kinds of property for the public business
convenience." It relates to persons and property, not to
cities or their inhabitants.'
The object of'this restriction is to prevent the legisla-
ttre froin interfering in local affairs by special legislation,
but not to check the power of municipal corporations to
pass local or special ordinances. Hence the general
authority to town councils of boroughs to prevent by ordi-:
nance the erection of wooden buildings within their limits
does not prevent them from forbidding such erection in a
paftof the borough only.2 The right to pass ordinances of
a local character within the municipal powers is also un-
affected by the prohibition of incorporation by special act.
3
.The effect of local option laws as special regulations
of, local, affairs has been Considered in a previous article.
The new constitution of Kentucky allows such laws in
relation to the sale, loan or gift. of vinous, spirituous or
malt liquors, bridges, turnpikes or other public roads, public
buildings or improvements; fencing, running at large of
stock, matters pertaining to common schools, paupers, and
the regulation by counties, cities, towns or other municipal-
ities of their local affairs, but no such laws can be enacted
unless applicable to all cities, towns, districts, precincts or
counties.
Besides the matters already mentioned, local or special
laws as to the following subjects have been held void as
regulating the affairs of cities, counties, etc.
Amending a special municipal charter.
4
Providing for boards to regulate municipal affairs in
cities, .in the place of commissions and commissioners
theretofore appointed.5
Allowing the inhabitants, of any species of munici-
'Loftus v. F. & M. Bk., 133 Pa., 97.
= Klinger v. Bickel, 117 Pa., 326., People v. Cooper, 83 Ill-, 585.
4 Bingham v. Camden, 4o N. J. L., i56; Pell v. Newark, id., 550.-5 Van Riper v. Parsons, 4o N. J. L., i.
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pality, except incorporated cities and towns, to form borough
governments.1
Providing for the appointment or election of local
officers or employees.'
Regulating their tenure of office 3 or salaries.'
Giving the courts power to grant licenses ; or even,
by the repeal of a local act, reviving, as to a particular
locality, a former general law giving such p6 wer. 6
Granting power to issue bonds.
7
Altering the ward lines in a city."
Providing for an appeal from the decision of the county
commissioners or city boards of revision of taxes in regard
to assessments for taxation.9
Requiring license taxes collected within the. limits of
an incorporated city or town, in counties of a certain class,
to be paid over to the town authorities for street improve-
ments. 0
The Georgia constitution provides that "whatever
tribunal or officers may hereafter be created by the* general
assembly for the transaction of county matters shall be
uniform throughout the State, and of the same name, juris-
diction, and remedies, except that the general assembly
may provide for the appointment of commissioners of roads
and revenue in any county." "1 It also gives the legislature
power "to provide for the creation of county commissioners
in such cotnties as may require them, and to define their
Long Branch v. Sloane, 49 N. J. L., 356.
Bingham v. Camden, 40 N. J. L., 156; Freeholders v. Stevenson,
46 id., 173,; Reid v. Wiley, id., 473; Hallock v. Hollinshead, 49 id., 64;
Gibbs v. Morgan, 39 N. J. Eq., 126; Ernst v. Morgan, id., 391; affirmed,
40 id., 733; Comth. v. Denworth, 145 Pa., 172.
3 New Brunswick v. Fitzgerald, 47 N. J. L., 499; affirmed, 48 id.,
457; Pierson v. O'Connor, 54 N. J. L., 36.
4 Coutieri v. New Brunswick, 44 N. J. L., 58.
5 Zeigler v. Gaddis, 44 N. J. L., 363.
'Sutterly v. Camden C. P., 44 N. J. L., 495.
7 Anderson v. Trenton, 42 N. J. L., 486.
Pell v. Newark, 4o N. J L., 550.
-9 Scranton v. Silkman, 113 Pa., 191.
,0 San Luis Obispo v. Graves, 84 Cal., 71.
11 Art. XI, .3.
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duties." ' Taken together these provisions were at first
considered to mean that local laws appointing commis-
sioners might be enacted, but that when enacted they
should be made uniform in operation in the counties that
required them;' but it has recently been held that even-
this uniformity is not essential.' One reason given for this
latter view is that since the constitution took effect the
legislature had passed many acts far from uniform in regard
to such matters. In view of the well-known tendency of
: legislatures to minimize the effect of all restrictions upon
special legislatioi, this is scarcely an argument. What sort
of uniformity the first clause above quoted did require, the
court did not state.
The Wisconsin constitution provides that the.legisla-
ture shall establish but one system of town and county
government, which shall be as nearly uniform as possible.'
All local laws relating to any feature of such government,
or in regard to any matter within its proper functions, are
held to violafe this provision. Thus acts changing the
.number of county supervisors,5 or restricting their powers, 6
or appointing commissioners to superintend the erection of
a court house in any one county ; or providing for the.
building of wagon roads out of the highway taxes in cer-
tain counties ;8 or relating to county aid in constructing
ing bridges, applicable to all but one county,9 have all been
held void on this account. The drainage of swamps and
marshes, on the other hand, not being considered a part of
the usual functions of town or county governments, an act
providing a special system for the drainage and reclamation
of lands in one county only, has been held valid.10 The
I Art. VI, 19, I.
2 Conley v. Poole, 67 Ga., 254.
3 Pulaski Co. v. Thompson, 83 Ga., 270.
4 Art. IV, 23.
5 Peck v. Riordan, 24 Wis., 541.
6 State v. Dousman, 28 Wis., 541.
7 State v. Supervs. Milw. Co., 25 Wis., 339-
slMcRae v. Hogan, 39 Wis., 529.
9 State v. Sauk Co. Commrs., 62 Wis., 376.
10 Bryant v. Robbins, 70 Wis., 258.
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requisite uniformity in county governments, moreover, does
not prevent the passage of a law prescribing the manner
of raising special county funds in one county, and for their
safe keeping and disbursement.'
A special law changing the composition of the board of
township supervisors in a particular county regulates town-
ship affairs, not county affairs, and hence it is allowable even
in a State where the constitution requires the legislature to
provide by general law for a system of township govern-
ment, such provision not affecting the regulation of town-
ship affairs in general.2
(6) Changing the names of places: California, Idah,
Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
South Dakota, Texas, Wyoming, Territories.
VIII. As To PUBLIC OFFICERS.
(I) Creating offices, or prescribing the powers and.
duties of officers in counties, cities, townships, or election
or school districts : California, Idaho, Missouri, Montana,
North Dakota (boroughs also: Pennsylvania), Texas- (not
election districts: Wyoming).
Except as in this constitution otherwise provided:
Idaho.
Regulating county and township offices: Nebraska.
Regulating the jurisdiction or duties of any class of
officers except municipal: Florida.
In Missouri it is held that while a purely local office
might (except for this provision be created by a local act,
the law which creates an office which is to exist for the
benefit of the whole State is necessarily general, whatever
be its form ; and also thmat the test as to such office (and
consequently as to the law creating it) is 'the character of
the duties, not the source whence the expenses are paid.',
This view would probably meet with general acceptance in
'Supervisors v. Pabst, 45 Wis., 314.
'Leach v. People, 122 Ill., 420, construing Art. VII, P 7, of the con-
stitution of 1846, being Art. X, P 5. of that of 1870.
. State v. Shields, 4 Mo. App., 259.
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other courts, but not the application of it to the particular
case, which held that a court of limited territorial juis-
diction was not a local court, but one for the benefit of
the whole State, and hence that the act creating it was
general.
(2) Affecting the fees or salaries of any officers Cali-
fornia, Florida (except that compensation may be graded
in proportion to population and necessary services required:
Indiana).
Increasing or decreasing the ialary or emoluments of
public officers: Mississippi.
Creating, increasing, ordecreasing-the fees, percentage,
or salaries (in some states, allowances) of public officers:
Califcrnia, Colorado, Idaho, -Kentucky, Montana, North
Dakota, Wyoming; during the term for which they were
,i elected or appointed: Idaho, Illinois, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New York, South Dakota, Territories.
Or extending the time for the collection thereof, or
authorizing officers to appoint deputies: Kentucky.
Any law authorizing extra compensation to any pub-
lic officer, agent or contractor, after the service has been
performed, or contract entered into: Michigan.
In the Mississippi constitution, besides the general
provision already given, it is provided that the legislature
shall not enact any law for one or more counties, not appli-
,able to all the counties in the State, increasing the uniform
charge for the registration of deeds, or regulating costs 'and
charges and fees of officers.1
An act establishing police justices in any incorporated
village, and thereby taking away the jurisdiction, of jus-
tices of the peace, has been held in New York not- to be a
local act decreasing the fees of public offiders within the
meaning of the constitution.2 .
In California the salaries of county officers are required
to be regulated by a dlassification of counties.3 An act
1 Const. Miss., i89o, Art. IV, 91.
People v. Duffy, 56 S. C. N. Y., 276.
3 Cal. Const., Art. XII, 5.
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changing the salaries in every class, but providing that in
some the change should take effect immediately, and in
others only from the expiration of the terms of those then
in office, was held to be special legislation in regard to
salaries.'
In the case of officers who have no "term" within the
meaning of the constitution, the prohibition is unqualified,
and their salaries, etc., cannot at any' time be altered but by
a general law.'
(3) Legalizing the unauthorized (California, Washing-
ton> or invalid- act of any officer, except as against the
State; California, Kentucky, North Dakota, Washington.
In Idaho, on the contrary, this is only forbidden "as
against the State:"
Legalizing the unauthorized or invalid acts of any offi-
cer or agent of the State or a (parish: Louisiana) county, or
municipality: Missouri.
IX. As TO HIGHWAYS, PUBLIC GROUNDS, ETC.
Though a more or less comprehensive prohibition of
special legislation in regard to highways, public grounds,
etc., is very usual, the various constitutions differ 'consider-
ably as to the particular matters to be affected by such
prohibition. These matters are:
Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, main-
taining, or vacating roads, highways, streets, town plats,
parks, cemeteries, graveyards, and public grounds not
owned by the State: California, Idaho, Kentucky.
Laying out, opening, vacating, or altering town
plats, streets, wards, alleys, and public grounds: South
Dakota.
Laying out, altering, maintaining, and closing roads,
highways, streets, and alleys: Louisiana.
Laying out, opening, altering, working, or discontin-
uing roads, highways, and alleys, 'or for draining swamps
or other lowlands: New York.
M NIler v. Kister, 68 Cal., 142.
: Gibbs v. Morgan, 39 N. J. Eq., 126.
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Laying out, opening, altering and except Minnesota)
working roads and highways, vacating roads, town plAts,
streets, alleys and public grounds: Colorado, Illinois, Min-
xnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota,
West Virginia, Wyoming, Territories.
Laying out, opening and working on (maintaining:
Oregon), highways: Indiana; (roads and highways: Iowa,
Mississippi); vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys and
public squares (public grounds: Mississippi): Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, .Mississippi, Nevada, Oregon; and -for the
election or appointment of supervisors: Indiana, Oregon.
Authorizing the laying out, opening, altering and
maintaining of roads, highways, streets and alleys; relating
to (regulating: Pennsylvania) cemeteries, graveyards and
public grounds other than those of the State: Missouri,
Pennsylvania, Texas.
Vacating roads, streets or alleys : Arkansas.
Vacating or allowing any road laid out by the commis-
sioners of highways, or any street in ,any city or village, or
any recorded town, plat : Michigan.
Laying out, opening or altering highways, except State
roads in more than one county, and military roads'built
under grants from Congress: Washington, Wisconsin.
In New York it is held that the above provision was
designed to prevent interference with the general highway
system of the State, but applies only to the matters
specifically referred to. A road may be graded, paved, -
provided with sewers or ornamented by special act, and the
transfer of the road of a private corporation to park com-
missioners is equally outside the scope of the prohiibition.'
It is also held not to apply to city streets, for the reason
that there being no restriction upon municipal incorpora-
tion by special act, and each city being governed as to
streets by its own charter, .no general law on the subject is
possible; 2 and the legislature can by special act authorize
1 People v. Banks, 67 N. Y., 568.
2 Matter v. Lex. Ave., 36 S. C. (N. Y.), 303; affirmed, 92 N. Y., 629;
Matter of Woolsey, 95 N. Y., 135, reversing 36 S. C. (N. Y.), 626.
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the common council of one city to discontinue a particular
street. In passing upon such an act the Supreme Court
said: "The legislature did not in this case undertake to
pass a bill prohibited by this provision. It assumed by this
act to confer authority upon the common council, and did
not undertake to exercise the power itself. At most it en-
larged the power therefore existing in the common council,
who are vested with power over the street by the provisions
of the charter.' '  A law applying to any county (contain-
ing a city of over 1ioo,ooo inhabitants, and territory con-
tiguous to the same mapped out into streets and avenues),,
and providing for the laying out,- etc., of such streets and
avenues, has also been held general as based on a valid
classification.' -
In New Jersey an act authorizing the boards of free-
holders of counties to open and maintain roads in all
counties not having county road boards has been held
local because based on an invalid classification.
3
A curative special act to legalize the unauthorized
proceedings of a county road board controlled by a general
law is not strictly an act to lay out or open roads, and hence
may be constitutional.'
X. As TO SCHOOLS.
Providing for the management of common schools:
California, .Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Montana,
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington,
Wyoming, Territories; the management and support of free
public schools: New Jersey; the support of common schools
and preservation of the school fund: Indiana, Oregon.
Regulating the management of public schools, the
building and repairing of schoolhouses (except in Louisiana),
and the raising of money for such purposes:. Louisiana,
LMissouri, Pennsylvania, Texas.
'Weinckie v. N. Y. C., etc., R. R. Co., 68 S. C. N. Y., 619.
2 Matter of Church, 92 N. Y.,. i.
'Township of Lodi z. State, 51 N. J. L., 402.
'Johnson v. Wells Co. Commrs., 107 Ind., 15.
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Providing for the management or support of any private
or common school, incorporating the same or granting such
school any privileges: Mississippi.
.Authorizing the apportionment of any part of the
* school fund: Minnesota, Washington, Wisconsin.
It is held in Illinois that this provision refers to the
management of common schools, after their establishment
and suport has been provided for, so that it does not affect
laws in regard to their establishment or support.-e g.,
* regulating the levying .of taxes for school purposes and the
custody of the funds raised thereby.'
XI. As To TAxATION.
(i) For the assessment and collection -of taxes: Cali-
fornia, Idaho, Kentucky, North Dakota, Washington, Wis-
- consin,.Wyoming; for State (territorial), county, township,
(except Idaho), and road (except Nevada) purposes: Indiana,
- . Iowa, Nevada, Oregon, Territories; for State, county and
municipal purposes : Florida.
The above is in addition to the very general require-
ment that 'the assessment and collection of taxes shall be
by general and uniform laws.
An act providing for the collection of taxes on rail-
roads situate in more than one county is special, even
in a State 'where the constitution provides a particular
method of assessing the property of such railroads for
taxation.2
In Oregon an act to establish the fees of sheriffs nnd
- clerkcs in certain counties, and to empower them to collect
- their fees, has been held to violate this provision, such fees.
being regarded as in the nature of taxes, inasmuch as they
were contributions levied on persons and property in invilum.'
In Nevada, however, it has* since been held that while
this is true in a certain sense, yet that they are not what
are usually known as taxes, and that, in that State at all
I Speight v. People, 87 II., 595; Fuller v. Heath, 89 id., 296.
2 People v. Cent. Pac. R. R. Co., 83 Cal., 393.
Manning v. Klippel, 9 Ore., 367.
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events, it was clear that it was never contemplated that the
constitution should require general laws as to fees.' This
prohibition applies to an act remitting and discharging all
claims for penalties, accrued before a certain date, for non-
payment of taxes when due, in cases where such taxes,
though at one time delinquent, had ultimately been paid,
with costs, before that date. The penalties legally falling
upon all delinquent taxpayers alike, the legislature cannot
select one class, ,those who have paid up before a certain
date, and remit their penalties.2
An act legalizing the acts and proceedings of officers
in regard to the assessment and collection of taxes also
comes within this prohibition, which makes no distinction
between retrospective and prospective legislation.
3
(2) Extending the time for the collection of taxes:
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Montajha, North Dakota, Texas, Washington, Wis-
consin, Wyoming; or relieving any assessor or collector'
from the due performance of his duties, or his sureties from
their liability: Kentucky, Missouri, Texas; nor can any
political corporation do this: Louisiana.
XII. As TO ELECTIONS.
(I) For the opening (except California, Kentucky) and
conducting of (providing for and conducting: Idaho) elec-
tions (for State, county, or township officers: Nebraska,
Oregon; State, county, or mudlicipal officers: Florida); and
designating (fixing or changing: Louisiana, Nevada, Mis-
souri, Texas) the place of voting: California, Kentucky,
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Mis-
souri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Texas, West Virginia, -Wyoming, Ter-
ritories.
Except on the organization of new counties: Cali-
fornia.
IState v. Fogus, 19 Nev., 247.
State v. Cal. M. Co., x5 Nev., 234; State v. C. V. M. Co., 16 id.,
3 Kimball v. Rosendale, 42 Wis., 407.
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Making or changing election precincts: Georgia.
Changing th boundaries of wards, precincts, or dis-
tricts, e:cept when new counties may be created: Ken-
.tucky.
In Maryland I and Tennessee,' the constitutions con-
taining ne such provision, laws regulating the methoA of
holdin*g elections have been sustained, although they only.
applied to certain localities, or classes of localities, in their
respective States. In the Maryland case, however, it was
observed, in a strong dissenting opinion, that, under the
constitutional provisions in regard to the right of suffrage,
the conditions on which that right could be exercised must
necessarily be the.same throughout the State.'
In Missouri an act dividing St. Louis into election dis-
tricts, and providing for the election of a justice of the
ptace in each district, was held valid, notwithstanding the
above provision. The court considered that the constitu-
tion had so separated that city from the other territorial
divisions of the State, as to give it an organization differ-
ent from that of any other city or county, and to necessitate
legislation applicable to it alone.4
(2) Regulating the election of county and township
officers: California, Idaho, Nevada.
Providing for th e election of members of the boards of
supervisors: New York; in townships, incorporated towns
or cities: Illinois, North Dakota.
1 Lankford v. Co. Commrs., 73 Md., io5.
Cook v. State, 90 Tenn., 407.
" The legislature has no right . . . to say that the voters of one
county shall not exercise this right [of suffrage] except upol; certain
conditions, and that voters of another county may exercise this right
without complying with such conditions. So careful is the constitution
to preserve this equality, that in the matter of registration of voters it
provides that such laws shall be uniform. A fortiori ought the regula-
tions and requirements of this act . . . to be uniform and to apply
to each and every voter in the State. Not only are the qualifications
which the constitution prescribes for the exercise of the right of suffrage
/ uniform, but all regulations in regard to its exercise must, as I construe
it, be uniform also:" Lankford v. Co. Commrs., 73 Md., 107, 115, dissetiting
opinion of RoBiNsoN, J.
' State v. Walton, 69 Mo., 556.
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In New York an act providing that in four certain
counties the supervisors should be -elected and hold office
for a term of years, was held to violate the provision above
cited, in regard to such officers, as being a local law pro-
viding for their election and not merely for their term of
office. '
Providing for the creating of districts for the election
of justices of the peace and constables: Mississippi.
XIII. GENERAL RESTRICTIONS.
(I) In any other case where a general law can be made
applicable:2 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado.
(Florida, constitution of i868), Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky (and would be advantageous: Mississ-
ippi), Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming, Terri-
tories.
The legislature shall pass general laws for all other
cases which, in its judgment, may be provided for by
general laws: New Jersey.
The legislature shall trom time to time provide, as far
possible, by general laws, for all matters usually appertain-
ing to special or private legislation: Maine.
A curative law, to legalize acts of local government
and the like, performed in good faith but defective, may
be general if the act has been done by members of a class.
Thus, where a general village incorporation law has been
held void, the villages which had attempted to be incor-
porated under it while it was supposed to be valid were
considered to form a class, and an act 'to validate their
incorporation was held general.3 But such a law must
often be special, because in many cases* no general law
could cover the case without being dangerously broad,
"'eople v. Hoffman, 6o How Pr. (N. Y.), 324; S. C., 24 Hun. (N. Y.),.
242.
2 How far this provision vests a discretion in the legislature as to the
applicability of general laws is considered in a prior chapter.
3 State v. Spande, 37 Mich., 322.
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while in others a general law would be superfluous.1 Thus,
in the case of an act to legalize the defective organization
of a school district already in existence, it was forcibly
pointed out by the court that as no precisely similar or
analogous case was alleged or suggested as existing else-
where in the State, and there was no legal presumption
that any such case existed, a general law suited to the case
would have no other or greater operation than the act in
question, and the latter was not within the evil sought to,
be corrected by the constitution.'
Where, however, the act done is not a lawful act'
legally defective in the particular case, but something
which there :was no legal power to do, it cannot be vali-
*dated by q special curative act. Thus, where a municipal
corporation has passed an ordinance which was beyond its
powers, to validate such an ordinance woquld practically be
the same thing as to specifically authorize it in one case
while denying the right so to ordain to all other munici-
palities similarly situated. It would be special legisla-
tion of the clearest kind, and wholly within the prohibi-
tion. 
3
It has been held in Nebraska that an act authorizing
the issue of bonds by any county, if such issue be required
by popular vote, to purchase grain for settlers whose crops
have suffered from drought, can be made general, and that
therefore a special act for the counties where such drought
actually existed could not be resorted to.'
. Among other matters which have been allowed to be
regulated by special laws, on the ground that no general
law could have been' made applicable to the case, ate the
following:
The payment of the salaries of the legislature then in
session.5
'Johnson v. Wells Co. Commrs., I07 Ind., 15.
2State v. Squires, 26 Io., 340.
3 Ind. School District v. Burlington, 6o ro., 5oo.
4 & re House Roll No. 284, 31 Neb., 505.
-'Ash v. Parkinson, 5 Nev., 15.
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Reimbursing a -public officer who had personally sup-
plied lost public funds.'
An appropriation to a farmers' protective associatioii
for the e:kpenses of defending suits for. alleged infringe-
ment of patents.
2
Authorizing a county superintendent to pay'certain
debts contracted by former school trustees.'
Districting the State by counties for judicial pur-
poses.4
Detaching a countr from a judicial district, and pro-
viding it with a court.5 -
Designing a place and otherwise providing for holding
court away from the county seat.
6
(2) In any other case where a general law has been
made applicable: Georgia.
For the benefit of individuals or corporations in cases
which are or "can be provided for by a general law,'or where
the relief sought can be given by any court: Alabama,
Mississippi.
No law shall be passed granting powers or privileges
in any case where the granting of the same shall have been
provided for by a general taw : Kentucky, Pennsylvania; or
where the courts have jurisdiction to grant the same or
give the relief asked for: Arkansas, Kentucky, Pennsyl-
vania, West Virginia.
In Maryland the legislature is forbidden to pass a
special law "for any case for which provision has been -
made by existing general law," but this does not forbid
local legislation,7 nor does it apply in the case of curative
laws.8
'Mount v. State, 9o Ind., 29.
2 Merchants' Union, etc., Co. v. Brown, 64 1o., 37"5.
7McIemie v. Gorman, 68 Ala., 422.
4 State v. Emmons, 72 1o., 265.
5 Coulter v. Routt Co., 9 Col., 258.
6 Cooper v. Mills Co., 69 Io., 350
State v. County Commrs., 29 Md., 516; Lankford v. County
Cofhmrs., 73 id., 205.
-O'Brien v. County Commrs., 51 Md., 15.
74
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Under the Georgia constitution the existence of a
general local option law prevents the enactment of a pro-
hibition law for one county,' and when a general law has
been passed in regard to any matter as to which a special law
had previously teen in force, the latter cannot be con-
tinued in force -by a sibsequent special act, as the case is
one to which a general law has been made applicable.2
Hence it has been held in Georgia that although the
legislature, when not checked by contract, may vary by a
special law any privilege, power or duty of a particular
corporation, except such privileges, etc., as are common to
all, yet as the code provides that all corporations shall
have ceriain specified privileges, etc., the legislature
cannot continue a charter in force after the date of its
expiration for the sole purpose of enabling the cor-
poration to defend suits then pending aeainst it. If the
corporation is to continue in existence, it must have all the
powers and duties possessed by corporations under the
general law.'
A law authorizing the people of one county to vote on
the question ofremoving a county seat, though local and
special, is not a law for the benefit of individuals or cor-
porations, and hence not within the provision of the con-
stitution of Alabama. "It affects the whole county, and
relates to its political organization."4
In any State where the restrictions upon special legis-
lation are numerous, most cases of grants of powers and
privileges (covered in Pennsylvania and some other States
by the general restriction above cited) are also specifically
prohibited. Apart from this, however, it may be, said that
the powers and privileges here referred to are such as may
be granted directly by a law, not such as incidentally
result from it. Thus an act creating a township or school
district does not of itself grant powers or privileges ; it is
Crabb v. State (Ga.), 15 S. E. Rep., 455.
2 Dougherty Co. v. Boyt, 71 Ga., 15.
3 Logan v. W. & A. R. R. Co., 87 Ga., 533.
4 Clarke v. Jack, 6o Ala., 270.
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merely an arrangement of governmental machinery, and
the powers and privileges result from the act creating that
machinery.'
(3) No local or special act shall be enacted indirectly
by the partial repeal of a general law: Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania; or by exempt-
ing from the operation of a general act any city, town,
district or county : Kentucky.
(4) All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform
operation: California, Florida, Iowa; throughout the
State: Kansas, North Dakota, Ohio.
As used in the constitution of Iowa, the first State to
adopt this provision, it is immediately followed by a pro-
hibition of all grants, to any citizen or class of citizens,
of privileges and immunities which shall not equally
belong, upon the same terms, to all* citizens. Standing
by itself, however, the former provision was, in a Cali-
fornia case, pronounced to be unintelligible, unless under-
stood as referring to privileges, immunities and burdens.2
A somewhat similar view was taken in Ohio, where the
provision was said tp be directed against the enactment of
local criminal laws, by which certain acts were made
offences in certain parts of the State only.3 Accordingly,
it was repeatedly held in these two States that the expres-
sion "laws of a general nature"I did not mean laws in
regard to a general subject, and heince that the provision
in questiofi did not prohibit special legislation merely
because general legislation would have been practicable.4
Acts authorizing a county to subscribe to the stock of a
railroad company,' limiting and regulating county officers'
fees in one county,' regulating the selection of jurors in
I Wolf's App., 58 Pa., 471.
2People v. Smith, 17 Cal., 547; approved in Brooks v. Hyde,
37 Cal., 366.
3 Cass v. Dillon, 2 0. St., 607.
Ryan v. Johnson, 5 Cal., 86; People v. Cent. Pae. R. R. Co., 43 id.,
398, 433; Ohio v. Covington, 29 0. St., 102; State v. Shearer, 46 0. St.,
275, overruling State v. Powers, 38 0. St., 54.
'Cass v. Dillon, 2 0. St., 607.
State v. Judges, 21 0. St., L
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one county,I granting power to appoint and control the
police force of a city,2 transferring an indictment to
another county for trial,3 establishing a limitation of
actions for the recovery of real estate in a particular city,
4
and authorizing a justice of the peace in any city of a cer-
tain grade to sue for his fees during his term,' have,
.accordingly, been held not to be of a general nature, and,
therefore, not affected by this provision. Acts as to the
jurisdiction of courts of common pleas,' as to the liability
of stockholders,7 and as. to county officers in certain classes
of counties,' were, in the same States, held to be of a
general nature.
In Kansas, however, herding and fence laws. have
been held to be of a general nature because they impose
"a rule of property which applies equally to all property
that can be affected by such a rule,"' and even in Ohio it
has lately been announced that where the general laws in
.regard to a subject do not contemplate the existence of
any local conditions which could affect the regulation of
such subject, all laws in regard thereto are necessarily of a
general nature. The custody and disbursement of the
public funds and the system of public accounts have'been
held to be of that nature, and very recently local law in
regard to sidewalks, in villages was held to be invalid
because'its subject was of a character that interested and
concerned the inhabitants of every village in the State.'0
These cases would seem to regard the expression "laws of
a general nature"I as practically equivalent to "laws in
regard to a general subject," i. e., a subject which can
properly be regulated by general laws.
I McGill v. State, 34 0. St., 228.
2Ohio v. Covington, 29 0. St., 102.
3 People v. Smith, 17 Cal., 547.
' Brooks v. Hyde, 37 Cal., 366.
5 Hart v. Murray, 48 0. St., 6o5.
6 Kelley v. State, 6 0. St., 269.
T French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal., 518.
8 Dougherty v. Austin, 94 Cal., 6or.
9Darling v. Rodgers, 7 Kan., 592 ; Robinson v. Perry, 17 id., 248.
10 State v. Ellet, 47 0. St., 90.
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The provision in regard to the uniform operation of
laws of a general nature means that if such lIws be enacted
for particular localities they will be null and void, and not
that they will be treated as operating uniformly tiroughout
the State in spite of their express terms. I'
An act for the refunding of taxes erroneously paid, in
counties containing a city of the first grade, violates this
provision.2
(5) All laws [in regard to matters as to which special
legislation is forbidden] shall be general and of uniform
operation throughout the State: Iowa, Florida, Minnesota,
Nevada, Wisconsin.
I State v. Thompson, 2 Kan. 433.
'Hamilton Co. Commrs. v. Rosehe (0.), 33 N. E. Rep., 4o8.
